One thing that I find myself continuing to think about is Bogost’s discussion of procedurality and the manner in which the idea of procedure is often negatively constructed:

The word procedure does not usually give rise to positive sentiments. We typically understand procedures as established, entrenched ways of doing things. In common parlance, procedure invokes notions of officialdom, even bureaucracy: a procedure is a static course of action, perhaps an old, tired one in need of revision. We often talk about procedures only when they go wrong: after several complaints, we decided to review our procedures for creating new accounts. But in fact, procedures in this sense of the word structure behavior; we tend to ‘see’ a process only when we challenge it. (3)

This discussion brings to mind Huizinga’s discussion of seriousness in play, and it also makes me think about how our understanding of play might be impacted by Bogost’s discussion of procedural rhetoric and “using processes persuasively” (3).

But I’m also wondering about what Bogost says about procedural representation and the argument that it “takes a different form than written or spoken representation. Procedural representation explains processes with other processes. Procedural representation is a form of symbolic expression that uses process rather than language” (9). I’m struggling with this demarcation between process and language and the fact that Bogost seems to be separating the two when he says that procedural representation uses process rather than language. So, I guess I’m wondering—are process and language really necessarily mutually exclusive? Or don’t they often intersect and inform each other, especially within the context of the process of writing?

And finally, I’ve been thinking about the types of games that Bogost explores and the fact that he states, “I am interested in videogames that make arguments about the way systems work in the material world. These games strive to alter or affect player opinion outside of the game, not merely to cause him to continue playing. In fact, many of the examples I will discuss strive to do just the opposite from arcade games: move the player from the game world into the material world” (47). I’ve been thinking about this in the context of an article Bogost wrote earlier this year that I read a while ago in which he seems to argue that, as the title itself pretty explicitly reveals, “video games are better without characters” based on the argument that games are better at constructing complex systems instead of individual stories about people. And I’m not sure that I agree with the types of games that Bogost seems to often privilege because perhaps such stories can also “make arguments about the way systems work in the material world” and perhaps larger systems can tell stories themselves.