1. Bogost describes rhetoric as a “general field of inquiry” concerned with persuasion and inscription of persuasive arguments. He distinguishes between many types of rhetoric (oral, written, visual, digital, procedural) based on the mode of inscription or inquiry they privilege. How does this position rhetoric in Bogost’s writing? Is it important as a standalone concept or must it be linked to something else always? How does his choice of classical philosophers as representatives of rhetoric affect its presentation and the role it plays in his writing? What are the importance and capabilities of rhetoric, according to Ian Bogost?
2. The key to procedural expression, according to Bogost, is that procedures are inflexible when they are performed by machines and programs. Bogost attributes a lot of expressive power to processes and machines themselves. How does this reshape or reconfigure the relationship between computers and writing? Is there evidence of this inflexibility controlling or influencing work and production in our previous readings on computers and composition in classroom settings up to this point?
3. Bogost compares procedures to bureaucracy, laws, and indicates “they are… crafted from the top down.” When defining play, Bogost relies on Salen and Zimmerman’s definition of play as a space of possibility within a rigid system (see attachment). For Salen and Zimmerman, that rigid system is largely constituted by what they call “rules,” similar to Huizinga’s conception of rules. What distinguishes rules from procedures and how do procedures and rules differ in practice? What makes procedures instructive or expressive in a way rules aren’t?

1. Bogost chides digital rhetoric scholars, saying “for scholars of digital rhetoric, to “function in digital spaces” often means mistaking subordinate properties of the computer for primary ones,” meaning they often misinterpret the communication functions computers facilitate is a misguided attempt to map oral rhetoric onto machines, when their true rhetorical potential lies in their computational abilities. Based on our other readings thus far on digital rhetoric, is it fair for Bogost to critique digital rhetoric scholars this way? How does taking a more machine-centric look at rhetoric change the parameters of digital rhetoric?
2. One of Bogost’s stated goals at the beginning of Persuasive Games is to argue for video games as a respected art form, and that the quality of life the art of video games reflect is procedurality. Procedurality, according to Bogost, is “the logic by which something works,” which he extends to social and cultural phenomena. Is this the key relationship of video games to real life, and is this what elevates video games to a higher art form?
3. What is the role of humans and human elements (or interference) in Bogost’s system of rhetoric?

Salen and Zimmerman_Rules of Play_Game Design Fundamentals_2004_ch10