In “Exploitationware,” Bogost argues that the appeal of the idea of gamification has “everything to do with rhetoric, and nothing to do with games. We like to think that the substance of ideas matters more than the names we give things, but that’s not true. Names offer powerful ways to advance a position” (139). While I’m with Bogost on the important role of names, I wonder if his argument here doesn’t run the risk of doing the same thing he’s arguing against (albeit in the opposite direction) in that it might run the risk of privileging the importance of rhetoric and names over that of games and “the substance of ideas.”

I have some similar concerns regarding his discussion of serious games:

After the initial calm the term provides, “serious games” fails to quell the resulting storm. And unfortunately, as serious games have progressed only a few have succeeded at riding the thunder. There just aren’t enough high-quality games that also serve serious purposes effectively. Making games is hard. Making good games is even harder. Making good games that hope to serve some external purpose is even harder. (141)

While I appreciate the manner in which Bogost challenges and troubles the way “serious” games get privileged, again, I wonder if he’s simply privileging other types of games instead—games that fit his own criteria regarding what makes a game “good.” I’m concerned, here, in the same way that I’m concerned with Gee’s discussion of so-called “good” games—what does it really mean for a game to be “high-quality” or “effective” or “good”? What does it really mean for a game to “serve some external purpose”? What kind of purpose is a good one? Who gets to establish these criteria?